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The problem we are considering is motivated by
the hidden subgroup problem, for which the “stan-
dard approach” is to use the oracle to produce the
coset state ρH =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G |gH〉〈gH |, with |gH〉 =
1√
|H|
∑
h∈H |gh〉. Determining H < G then amounts
to distinguishing the ρH , given a small number of
samples (disregarding complexity issues).
Abstractly, one is given a set of quantum states
{ρi : i = 1, . . .N} on a d-dimensional Hilbert space
H, with the property that the pairwise fidelities are
bounded away from 1:
∀i 6= j F (ρi, ρj) := ‖√ρi√ρj‖21 ≤ F < 1.
The question is: how many copies of the unknown
state ρi does one need to be able to distinguish them
all with high reliability? In other words, we would
like to find, for 0 < ǫ < 1, the minimal n for which
there exists a POVM (Mi)i=1,...,N on H⊗n such that
for all i, Tr(ρ⊗ni Mi) ≥ 1− ǫ. Of course, this minimal
n will depend on the precise geometric position of the
states relative to each other, but useful bounds can
be obtained simply in terms of the number N and
the fidelity F .
Upper bound. We invoke a result of Barnum and
Knill [1] which says that, assuming a probability dis-
tribution (pi) on the state set, the average success
probability is lower bounded as
Psucc :=
∑
i
piTr(ρ
⊗n
i Mi)
≥ 1−
∑
i6=j
√
pipj
√
F (ρ⊗ni , ρ
⊗n
j ) ≥ 1−N
√
F
n
,
which is ≥ 1− ǫ if
n ≥ 2− logF (logN − log ǫ) . (1)
In fact, this success probability is achieved by the
“square root” or “pretty good” measurement [3],
which, according to [1], has error probability not
more than twice that of the optimal measurement.
So, for every distribution there exists a POVM at-
taining success probability ≥ 1 − ǫ. Conversely, for
fixed POVM one can try to find the worst probability
distribution – which may be the point mass on the
state with minimal Tr(ρ⊗ni Mi). But looking at the
payoff function of this game, the success probabil-
ity, we see that it is bilinear in the strategies of the
players, the probability vector (pi) and the POVM
(Mi), and that furthermore the strategy spaces of
both players are convex. Hence, we can use the min-
imax theorem [5]:
max
(Mi)
min
(pi)
Psucc = min
(pi)
max
(Mi)
Psucc ≥ 1− ǫ,
so there exists a POVM Mi such that for all i,
Tr(ρ⊗ni Mi) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Lower bound. We quote from [2], the following
lower bound (Theorem 1.4): to distinguish the states
ρi with success probability ≥ η,
n ≥ 1
log(λd)
(logN + log η) (2)
copies are necessary, where λ := maxi ‖ρi‖ is the
largest eigenvalue among the operators ρi.
Applications and discussion. For constant η and
ǫ, the upper and lower bounds of eqs. (1) and (2)
are comparable, provided λ = O(1/d), which holds
for many important examples of the hidden subgroup
problem. Our upper bound can be viewed as a gener-
alisation and improvement of the results in [2] (Theo-
rem 1.6), which themselves improve on [6], to the ef-
fect that n = O(logN) copies of a coset state are suf-
ficient to distinguish from among N subgroups (c.f.
[7] which has n = O(log |G|) when specialising to the
hidden subgroup problem).
Here, we get rid of assumptions on the group’s
structure (and indeed groups at all), as well as a di-
mensional term in [6]. Observe that by using the
game theoretic trick (c.f. [4]) we obtain a measure-
ment with worst case error ǫ, unlike previous ap-
proaches including [2].
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